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Abstract
We report experimental results indicating that defensive distillation suc-
cessfully mitigates adversarial samples crafted using the fast gradient sign
method [2], in addition to those crafted using the Jacobian-based iterative
attack [5] on which the defense mechanism was originally evaluated.
1 Introduction
Despite their successful application to several machine learning tasks, deep neu-
ral networks have been shown to be vulnerable [8], upon completion of their
training, to evasion attacks—as is the case with other machine learning tech-
niques [1, 6]. In the case of deep neural networks, such attacks can be performed
by crafting adversarial examples [8]: subtly (and often humanly indistinguish-
ably) modified malicious inputs crafted to compromise the integrity of the deep
neural network outputs. Following [1, 8], several approaches have been intro-
duced to craft adversarial examples [2, 5]. We refer readers interested in the
details of these crafting algorithms to the following book chapter [9], which
includes a detailed presentations of these different approaches. In this techni-
cal report, we discuss a defense mechanism proposed in [7], named defensive
distillation. Specifically, we present experimental results complementary to the
evaluation of the attack’s effectiveness that was included in the original paper [7].
2 Defensive Distillation
Traditionally, a deep neural network f used for classification is trained on a
dataset (X,Y ) = {(x, y)}, which is a collection of pairs (x, y) of inputs x and
class labels y. A class label y simply indicates the index of the class to which
sample x belongs and can be encoded as an indicator vector. The neural network
is trained to minimize its prediction error ‖f(x) − y‖ by back-propagating [3]
the gradients of a cost function—quantifying the error made on each sample x
in the training dataset X—with respect to the neural network’s parameters.
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Introduced in [7] as a defense mechanism to increase the robustness of deep
neural networks, defensive distillation alters the training of a deep neural net-
work used for classification essentially by re-configuring its last layer. This last
layer—a softmax—computes probabilities fi(x) for each class i of the problem
by applying the following transformation to the logits, which can be considered
as class scores z(x) produced by the neural network:
fi(x) =
ezi(x)/T∑n−1
l=0 e
zl(x)/T
(1)
The inputs of the softmax layer are thus divided by a factor T named tempera-
ture. This temperature parameter is traditionally set to T = 1 in the literature.
Higher temperatures T yield uniformly distributed probabilities: each class is
assigned a probability close to 1/n where n is the number of classes in the classi-
fication problem. Instead, lower temperatures yield discrete probability vectors
with a large probability (close to 1) assigned to the most likely class and small
probabilities (close to 0) assigned to the other classes.
Defensive distillation [7] alters the training of a classifier in the following way:
1. A first instance of the neural network f is trained as described above using
the training data (X,Y ) where the labels Y indicate the correct class of
samples X. However, the temperature of the neural network softmax is
raised to high values—larger than 1.
2. This first neural network instance is used to infer predictions on the train-
ing data. This produces a new training dataset (X, f(X)) where the class
labels indicating the correct class of samples X are replaced with proba-
bility vectors quantifying the likeliness of X being in each class.
3. A second—distilled—instance of the neural network f is trained using this
newly labeled dataset (X, f(X)). The distilled network is trained at the
same high temperature than the first instance. However, when training
completes and the network is deployed to make predictions, its tempera-
ture is set back to 1 so as to increase the confidence of its predictions.
3 Robustness of Distilled Neural Networks to
the Fast Gradient Sign Method
In [7], defensive distillation is evaluated on the attack introduced in [5], which
estimates the sensitivity of the targeted deep neural network by computing its
Jacobian and iteratively altered components with large sensitivity. The evalua-
tion of distillation showed that the attack, originally successful at rates of 97% on
MNIST [4] was mitigated, reducing the success rate to 0.45%. We now present
an evaluation of defensive distillation as a defense mechanism to mitigate ad-
versarial examples crafted using the fast gradient sign method, introduced in [2].
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Figure 1: Success of the Fast Gradient Sign Method [2] when defensive distilla-
tion is applied to the MNIST model, as described in [7].
We reproduce the experimental setup described in [7]. It considers a 9 layer
deep neural network classifying handwritten digits of the MNIST dataset. We
train a baseline network without distillation. It achieves 99.51% accuracy on
the test set, which is comparable to state-of-the-art performance on this task.
This network can be attacked using the fast gradient sign method [2] with a
success rate of 88.03% when the input variation parameter is set to ε = 0.3. We
then train a collection of distilled networks for several temperatures T ranging
from 1 to 100, and measure the success of the attack for each of these networks
by crafting an adversarial example for each of the 10, 000 test set samples.
The results are reported in Figure 1. As temperature increases, the attack is
mitigated with a success rate smaller than 1.5% at a temperature of T = 100.
4 Conclusion
We empirically demonstrated that defensive distillation mitigates adversarial
samples crafted using the fast gradient sign method introduced in [2], in addition
to those crafted using the Jacobian-based iterative approach introduced in [5].
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